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Are Weberian bureaucracies a precondition for capitalist markets or is it the other way 
around? According to the developmental school, state bureaucracies organized along 
Weberian precepts is necessary for successful state-led growth. Yet some level of 
economic wealth also appears to be necessary for achieving such desirable institutions. 
Departing from conventional linear approaches to development, this essay develops and 
applies a coevolutionary approach that traces the mutual adaptation of bureaucracies 
and markets among local states in China. My analysis demonstrates that the particular 
features of bureaucracy that promote growth vary over the course of development, even 
among locales within a single country. More surprisingly, I find that the bureaucratic 
forms that initially sparked growth actually defied Weberian norms of technocratic 
specialization and impersonality. In other words, in rethinking the relationship between 
markets and institutions, we must distinguish between market-building and market-
preserving institutions. Conventionally good institutions like Weberian bureaucracies 
are necessary to preserve markets after they have already emerged; however, it is the 







Scholars and policymakers have long agreed that the establishment of effective 
bureaucracies organized along Weberian precepts is a foundation of capitalist markets. 
This axiom is especially true among developmental states—late-developing economies 
that require strong, purposive state interventions to accelerate processes of economic 
catch-up (Gerschenkron, 1962). Yet the belief that Weberian bureaucracies are necessary 
for state-led growth begs the question of under what conditions and how such 
bureaucracies arise in the first place. Although effective state agencies seem 
indispensable for markets, economic growth also seems necessary for achieving these 
institutions. 
Do Weberian bureaucracies lead to capitalist markets or is it the other way 
around? More broadly posed, which comes first in development—state capacity or 
economic growth? Existing responses may be divided into three groups.  
The developmental state school argues that it is the decisive establishment of 
Weberian bureaucracies that preceded and paved the way for developmental success 
(Woo-Cumings, 1999). According to Weber (1968), the type of bureaucracy that 
complements market capitalism must possess certain legal-rational attributes: 
separation of public office from private gains, eradication of corruption, functional 
specialization, reliance on technical expertise, meritocratic recruitment, to name a few. 
Qualitative studies of the East Asian miracle economies, including Japan (Johnson, 
1982), South Korea (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995), Taiwan (Wade, 1990), and Singapore 
(Huff, 1995), all conclude that these governments were able to effectively promote the 
economy because they had first established professional civil services and eradicated 
petty corruption. Quantitative studies by Evans and Rauch (1999; 2000) further 
demonstrate that the degree of “Weberian-ness” and economic growth are positively 
correlated.  
Another school, associated with modernization theory (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), 
contends that Weberian bureaucracies—and market-supporting institutions in general—
are a consequence of economic prosperity, rather than its precursor and cause. In a 
cross-national regression analysis of income per capita and the World Bank’s measure of 
“government effectiveness,” Kurtz and Schrank conclude: “there is far more reason to 
believe that growth and development spur improvements in governance than vice versa” 
(2007, 538). Pointedly, they question the developmental state literature: “The 
Kuomintang [the ruling party in Taiwan] ruled mainland China through a combination 
of cronyism, clientelism, and naked force until 1949. It is hard to imagine that these 
same political leaders created a ‘developmental state’ in Taiwan out of whole cloth a few 
short years thereafter” (2007, 541). On a similar chord, Goldsmith’s (2012) comparative 
case study of four countries suggests that civil service reforms were successfully enacted 
only after these countries had become sufficiently wealthy.  
Yet a third body of literature agrees that Weberian bureaucracies are a 
prerequisite for developmental success but argues that the acquisition of such 
institutions is a function of unique historical experiences. Kohli (2004) brings attention 
to the role of colonial legacies, stressing that third world countries had different starting 
points when they embarked on state-led industrialization after WWII. Japan’s brutal but 
invested colonialization of South Korea laid the foundation of a modern bureaucracy, 
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which inadvertently empowered the South Korean government to pursue developmental 
goals in the 1970s. By contrast, Nigeria was “governed on the cheap” by the British; upon 
independence, it was barely a modern state and thus lacked the capacity to steer the 
economy. Importantly, Kohli’s study suggests that the success of the East Asian 
developmental states was exceptional. In his words, “Very few developing countries 
embarked on their quest for industrialization with such favorable conditions already in 
place” (2004, 103).1  
All three schools of thought are correct—but I argue that they are only partially 
correct. The developmental state school argues that Weberian bureaucracies lead to 
markets, but it is unable to account for the origins of effective and coherent 
bureaucracies. The modernization school argues that growth enables state capacity 
building, but it does not explain the sources of economic growth. The historical school 
points rightly to the colonial origins of differing starting points among late developers, 
but it leaves few indications as to how poor and weak states, lacking the right history, 
might ever escape the poverty trap.  
Instead, I propose an alternative—coevolutionary—theory of the relationship 
between Weberian bureaucracies and capitalist markets. As Weber underscores in 
Economy and Society, development is by nature multi-faceted change, entailing not only 
the rise of industries and markets, but also a radical remaking of society, administration, 
and politics. As Weber famously states, “Capitalism and bureaucracy have found each 
other and belong intimately together” (1968, 1465). And he emphasizes, “This condition 
is everywhere the product of a long development” (1968, 957). In other words, 
development is coevolutionary. States and markets adapt to each other and evolve 
together over time. Our conventional focus on positing linear causal relations between 
dependent and independent variables (i.e., either state capacity causes economic growth 
or vice versa) has obscured the obvious interdependence between growth and 
governance.2  
Although the idea of “things changing reciprocally” (coevolve) is quite intuitive, 
the task of systematically documenting the processes of coevolution among many 
interacting parts is far from easy. The first-order challenge of studying the endogenous 
relationship between economy and bureaucracy is methodological. Hence, one objective 
of this essay is to outline an analytic template for mapping the steps of coevolutionary 
paths.  
After introducing this template, I will demonstrate its explanatory utility by 
applying it to analyze the mutual emergence of professional bureaucracies and state-led 
industrial growth among local governments in China. Reform-era China presents an 
exceptionally instructive case because within the span of a single generation, China has 
undergone remarkable economic and bureaucratic transformation, surpassing even the 
East Asian Tigers in speed and in magnitude (Brandt & Rawski, 2008, 1). I focus on the 
                                                            
1 On similar arguments about the long-lasting effects of colonialism on present-day development outcomes, 
see (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Handley, 2008; Lange, Mahoney, & vom Hau, 2006). 
2 As Przeworski concludes in a sweeping review of the literature on institutions, “In the end, the motor of 
history is endogeneity. From some initial circumstances and under some invariant conditions, wealth, its 
distribution, and the institutions that allocate factors and distribute incomes are mutually interdependent 
and evolve together” (2004, pp. 185, emphasis added). 
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local level because although China is a single-party authoritarian regime, it is also highly 
decentralized, both economically and administratively (Landry, 2008). Indeed, Oi has 
characterized China as “a qualitatively new variety of developmental state,” with “local 
governments in the lead role” (Oi, 1995, 1113; 1999, 3).3 Then, within a city, I narrow in 
on how bureaucratic strategies of investment recruitment (i.e., attracting businesses to 
invest locally), a central task of any developmental state, impacted and was in turn 
impacted by the rise of markets.  
By mapping the process of coevolution between bureaucracies and markets, I 
arrive at a core conclusion that integrates and yet departs from conventional wisdoms: 
the types of state capacity for growth promotion vary over the course of development, 
not only among countries but also among locales within a single country. Even more 
surprisingly, I find that the bureaucratic forms that initially sparked growth defied 
Weberian norms of “good” bureaucracies, including technocratic specialization and 
impersonality. In other words, it is the adaptive refashioning of preexisting “weak” 
institutions that first built markets. Weberian bureaucracies serve to preserve markets.4  
My conclusion extends on this volume’s efforts to disaggregate the concept of 
state capacity. As the editors emphasize, “state capacity is not necessarily fungible across 
issue areas” (Introduction, 4), which means, for example, that state capacity in 
stimulating the economy may not translate into state capacity in promoting social 
inclusion or environmental conservation. They also sharply note that state capacity is not 
“a single quality that is absent or present in differing degrees;” instead, it is better 
understood as “a constellation of organizational qualities” (Introduction, 29).  
Joining the editors’ emphasis on the non-fungible quality of state capacity, I go 
further to add a temporal dimension to the argument: state capacity varies not only by 
policy areas but also by stages of development. While the idea that state capabilities may 
vary at early and late growth stages has been earlier raised by others (Chang, 2002; 
Doner, 2009; Rodrik, 2007), I take on a crucial task underscored by the editors of 
explaining “why state capacity is not fungible” across stages of development 
(Introduction, 4). My short answer is that the goals, constraints, and resources of 
development are very different at market-building and market-preserving phases; 
therefore, the particular bureaucratic structures that fit these varying contexts are also 
different. One implication of my argument is that Weberian bureaucratic traits are not in 
fact universally best. Weberian traits fit modern capitalist markets, provided that such 
markets are already in place. But the bureaucracy that can effectively spur markets when 




3 Discussions of the developmental quality of China’s local governments abound. For more examples, see 
(Blecher & Shue, 2001; Walder, 1995; Whiting, 2001). 
4 Dominant theories in political economy that posit “good” institutions (private property rights protection 
paired with limited government) as necessary for growth refers, as Weingast terms, to “market-preserving 
institutions” (North & Weingast, 1989; Weingast, 1995). The term itself indicates that these are institutions 
that preserve markets, a problem that applies to already developed economies. For developing countries, 




The Building Blocks of a Coevolutionary Framework 
 
 To study development—both market and state changes—as a coevolutionary 
process, the first order of business is to define “coevolution” and its association term 
“adaptation.” The words “evolve” (or coevolve) and “adapt” are commonly used by social 
scientists in reference to change but seldom defined. As John Holland, a leading theorist 
of complex adaptive systems, defines, adaptation is the process by which an agent “fits 
itself to the environment” (1996, 9) This process of “fitting” entails four distinct 
mechanisms, including variation (generating alternatives), selection (choosing among 
and recombining available alternatives to form new permutations), retention (keeping 
the selections or abandoning them for new selections at later periods), and niche 
creation (developing a unique role and resource space in relation to other units within a 
collective). As Lustick states, evolution should not be “confused with development, 
progress, gradualism, or, indeed, any kind of change” (2011, 3). This is because 
coevolution is a particular type of change involving adaptation among two or more parts 
of a system.  
 To sharpen the distinctive features of coevolution vis-à-vis other types of 
institutional change featured in the literature, consider the analogy of three ways in 
which a tree can change. First, a tree is struck by lightning and falls to the ground. In this 
instance, change happens through an exogenous shock. In this view of change, wars and 
colonial conquests are viewed as shocks that abruptly disrupted existing structures, 
replacing them with new ones (for example, see Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Kohli, 
2004). These newly imposed structures, it is held, would self-reinforce and remain in 
place under another shock hits. Krasner (1988) labels this type of change “punctuated 
equilibrium.”  
In a second scenario, a tree is eaten by termites and disintegrates months later. 
This time, change happens through gradual processes, but it does not involve adaptation 
between the tree and the termites. The seminal work of Thelen and her collaborators on 
“institutional evolution” and “gradual institutional change” studies how institutions may 
change even in the absence of exogenous shocks (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & 
Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2004). They bring attention to “gradual types of change” like 
layering (adding a new feature to an existing institution) and conversion (changing the 
use of existing features). However, it must be emphasized that gradual change does not 
equate adaptation or evolution. For instance, aging is a gradual form of change. As one 
ages, wrinkles are added in layering process until a ruddy face slowly but steadily turns 
wizened. But aging, as we know, does not result from our efforts to adapt to the 
environment; if anything, it is the other way around: we are forced to adapt the 
inevitable process of aging. Coevolution is more than just a process of incremental 
changes—it is an adaptive process that involves learning and mutual feedbacks. 
Finally, in a third scenario, picture the acacia tree, which features many spikes on 
its branches. The acacia tree evolved spikes to keep herbivores from over-eating its 
leaves. In turn, herbivores adapted to the tree’s defensive mechanism by evolving spike-
resistant traits (for example, giraffes evolved extra thick tongues). The animals that 
evolve the strongest resistance to spikes will subsequently colonize the acacia trees. To 
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survive, other animals will have to develop other resources spaces or niches within the 
ecology where they can exercise a competitive edge. This third scenario illustrates 
coevolution.  
The property of mutual adaptation over time in the process of coevolution 
requires that we specify systematic steps to collect data for and to map this particular 
form of change. Below I outline an analytic template consisting of four steps.  
 
Four Steps of Mapping Coevolution  
 Figure 1 summarizes the four basic steps of mapping coevolutionary paths of 
mutual feedbacks. Step 1 involves identifying two or more domains of significance (D1 
and D2). Domains could be populations or spheres of activities. In the case I will later 
present, I focus on the domains of economy (size and structure of industrial markets) 
and bureaucracy (mode of investment promotion).  
Step 2 is to identify the relevant time period and significance junctures of change 
(T1 to T4). In the case of reform-era China, the relevant time period starts from 1978 
(beginning of market reforms) or 1993 (beginning of an expanded phase of reforms) to 
the current period.  
Step 3 is to identify dominant traits in each domain in each significant period. In 
the coevolution of bureaucracies and markets, the most salient institutional changes are 
likely to be qualitative (or structural) in nature, rather than quantitative. Growth as 
measured by GDP per capita is a quantitative change. However, even in the economy, 
significant changes are often qualitative in nature, which may not be easily quantified or 
even meaningful to reduce to a numerical scale. For example, in Varieties of Capitalism, 
Hall and Soskice (2001) draw a distinction between liberal and coordinated market 
economies. If a country evolves from one capitalist model to another over time, its GDP 
figures may not change, but its structural patterns would have been profoundly altered. 
This is why I illustrate institutional changes in Figure 1 as patterns, rather than as 
numbers.  
As Pierson points out, “Contemporary social scientists typically take a ‘snapshot’ 
view of political life” (Pierson, 2004, 2). Normally, when studying China or locales within 
China, observers are inclined to document and draw conclusions from the most recent 
problems and phenomenon. Understandably, given how quickly changes unravel in 
China, keeping up with the most current developments is already a challenging and rich 
exercise. However, snapshots provide only a temporally limited view of the long-term 
historical process. When present outcomes are studied in isolation from earlier periods, 
snapshots may even lead to erroneous conclusions, such as the belief that good 
institutions observed alongside capitalist wealth had preceded and caused such wealth. 
Hence, if our objectives are to understand how a currently observed status quo 
emerged and evolved over time, we will need a different approach to data collection. 
Instead of studying a given set of issues only in their present state, I choose to investigate 
the same issues over multiple periods back in time. The product of this effort may be 
likened to a panel dataset (multiple attributes observed over multiple time periods and 
repeated across units). When implemented in the field, collecting a panel dataset 
requires, on my part, locating and interviewing local actors who have been in office for a 
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sufficiently long period of time to have witnessed change since the 1980s. Oral histories 
conducted with these actors are supplemented with archival materials and secondary 
literature.5  
 




 Step 4, after collecting the panel dataset, is to trace the mechanism of mutual 
influence between changes observed in each domain. Concretely, this means to locate the 
direction of influence of one domain on the other at a given juncture (A1), with attention 
to whether the affected domain feeds back to its original source of change at a later 
period (A2). I further consider whether causal influence (A1, A2) is exercised through the 
mechanisms of variation (generating new options for agents), selection (shaping 
incentives to select certain traits over others), or retention (reinforcing or eroding 
previous selections).  
Figure 1 is, of course, a stylization of my framework. In messy social worlds, there 
will be numerous instances where observed patterns do not conform neatly to a zigzag 
coevolutionary pattern.6 For example, coevolutionary processes may be interjected by 
exogenous shocks (Krasner, 1988). Despite these real-world complications, the 
                                                            
5 The empirical material in this chapter is drawn from my forthcoming book, How China Escaped the 
Poverty Trap. A detailed discussion of my interviewing procedures, the coverage of interviews, and citation 
protocol is provided in the methodological appendix at the end of the book.  
6 The zig-zag pattern reflects an “ideal” reciprocal pattern of coevolution. In reality, coevolutionary paths 
often run in multiple directions: reciprocal, simultaneous, and lagged (Lewin & Volberda, 2003, p. 584). 
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procedures outlined can help guide our investigations into when, how, and why 
particular dimensions of the state and the economy mutually adapt and transform 
together.  
 
Applying a Coevolutionary Approach to Local China 
 
 Having spelled out the essential steps of a coevolutionary framework, I will now 
demonstrate its application by zooming in on the paths of different locations within 
China. Before introducing the protagonists, a briefing of China’s administrative structure 
is in order. China is a unitary political system, but administratively and financially, it is 
one of the world’s most decentralized administrations (Landry, 2008; OECD, 2006). 
Operating as a nested hierarchy, there are five levels of government: center, provinces 
(31), cities (over 600), counties (about 2,500), and townships (about 45,000) (Lieberthal, 
1995). Sub-provincial governments are responsible for funding and delivering essential 
public services, including education, health, public safety, pensions, and urban 
infrastructure (OECD, 2006). County governments account for half of China’s GDP 
production and one third of public employment (Ang, 2012b; Kung & Chen, 2012). 
 Decentralization has been a key feature of China’s reform strategy. Economists 
have characterized China as an “M-form” hierarchy, wherein each locale operates like a 
self-sufficient and autonomous unit (Donnithorne, 1972; Qian & Xu, 1993). For instance, 
cities and counties can have tremendous autonomy in shaping and implementing their 
own economic and institutional plans, ranging from the choice to cultivate particular 
industries, design incentive packages for investors, introduce cadre bonus schemes, to 
the allocation and spending of retained tax revenue. However, local autonomy is 
constrained within broad policy parameters laid out by the central and provincial 
governments.7 
Thus, I characterize central-local state agency in the Chinese political system as a 
relationship of “directed improvisation.” The central government directs by authorizing 
and yet delimiting the boundaries of localization through nationally issued mandates 
(Ang, Forthcoming, Chap 3), but it is the local governments at all levels, reaching down 
to the grassroots, who improvise solutions to locally-specific and ever-evolving problems. 
Central authorities do not dictate to localities exactly how they should respond to 
contingencies at every juncture—such a task is beyond the knowledge and reach of 
central planners. Within each locality, the party-state is made up of a thin silver of elite 
decision-makers (primarily the party secretary, the state chief, and members of the party 
committee) and a large bureaucracy consisting of party and state organs and their 
subsidiary organizations. Counties are staffed on average by about 20,000 party-state 
employees.  
 Given heterogeneous local conditions and extensive decentralization, it is no 
surprise to find a whole variety of sub-national political economies within China. Some 
localities are rich and developmental but others poor and predatory (Baum & 
                                                            
7 For example, after the 1994 tax-sharing reform, local governments were given the autonomy to generate 
revenue by leasing land. But they had to do so within restrictions set by the central government, which, in 
this case, were quotas imposed on the amount of agricultural land that can be converted for urban use.  
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Shevchenko, 1999). Geography is a prominent driver of regional divisions. Much of 
China’s prosperity and modernization is concentrated on the coast, provinces like 
Guangdong, Fujian, and Zhejiang. These regions command ready access to export 
markets, long entrepreneurial histories stretching back to imperial times, and ties to the 
overseas Chinese diaspora (Rawski, 2011; Ye, 2014). The Western provinces, such as 
Tibet, Qinghai, and Yunnan, are typically the most remote and impoverished. However, 
because of their hinterland geography (as in the case of Tibet and Xinjiang) and presence 
of restive minority populations, these provinces tend to receive more fiscal transfers and 
preferential policies from the central authorities (Ang, 2012a; Wang, 2004). It is the 
central provinces, including Hubei and Jiangxi, who are “caught in an awkward position” 
of being “neither eastern nor western” (Xinhua, July 2, 2009). As a result, many locales 
in the central region actually enjoy less aid and fewer opportunities than those in the far 
west.  
Regional disparities do not end at provincial borders. Measured in terms of 
population, some provinces in China are the size of countries. Shandong, one of China’s 
largest provinces, has a population of 91 million, larger than the United Kingdom’s. Thus, 
as Kellee Tsai observes, “Within a single province, evidence can be mustered for market-
preserving federalism, local state corporatism, and even klepto-patrimonialism” (2004, 
p. 18). 
 The years of 1978 and 1993 marked two watershed events on the national reform 
timeline. In December of 1978, the central leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping 
announced the decision to “reform and open.” This decision unleashed a wave of 
agricultural, enterprise, fiscal, and administrative reforms throughout the country. 
However, the early period of reform in the 1980s introduced only partial market reforms 
(Naughton, 1995). So, for example, pricing remained partially state-controlled; there 
were many restrictions on foreign investments; and private entrepreneurship was not 
officially endorsed. Then, in 1993, the central leadership made a monumental decision to 
shift gears from partial to full-fledged market reforms, encapsulated in the vision of 
building a “socialist market economy” (Qian & Wu, 2003). For local governments, the 
1993 central decision opened the doors to capitalism firmly and widely. Foreign 
investments and private entrepreneurship were permitted and encouraged, which soon 
replaced the earlier boom of township and village enterprises as the engine of industrial 
growth. Hence, in my analyses, the story of full-fledged capitalist reforms begins from 
1993.  
 Let me first introduce the three local cases I will later discuss. Note that my 
coevolutionary analysis will focus mainly on the first case, but I wish to bring in two 
other cases as points of comparison. Also, for the purpose of illustration within the 
limited space of this essay, my later discussion will center only on investment 
recruitment and the rise of industrial markets. There are good reasons to focus on these 
two dimensions. Among low-income countries, the conversion from agriculture to 
industry is a main avenue of economic growth and modernization. And in any 
developmental state seeking to industrialize rapidly, prospecting foreign investors and 
capital is a foremost task. Normally, we expect that the work of designing and executing 
investment policies should be assigned to well-educated technocrats with economic 
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expertise. This is why the Singapore government delegated investment promotion to the 
Economic Development Board (EDB), which is a star agency of the city-state. And in 
South Korea, the equivalent body is the KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency). 
 Investment recruitment is, of course, only one dimension of the larger 
developmental enterprise. For now, I will explore only this dimension, and to highlight 
the patterns of mutual feedbacks, I will also deliberately stylize the discussion, omitting 
many details along the way. Detailed accounts of the coevolution among markets, 
property rights structure, developmental strategies, and the dominant mode of 
corruption across locales in China are contained in my book (Ang, Forthcoming).  
  
1. Forest Hill City, Fujian province (coastal) 
 
Fujian is a coastal province that lies across the strait from Taiwan. Forest Hill is a 
city located in the interior of Fujian, with a population of about 2.5 million residents. I 
use Forest Hill as my main illustrating case because this city features a combination of 
growth opportunities (location in a coastal province and possession of abundant natural 
resources, including coal, wood, and minerals) and constraints (it does not lie directly on 
the coast and is surrounded by hills). Thus, the coevolutionary path in Forest Hill is 
neither too fast nor completely stagnant.  
Cities are a level of government below the central level and the provinces. Each 
city has a few urban districts (qu) and suburban or rural counties (xian) under its 
jurisdiction, typically with the districts at the core and the counties fanning out into the 
periphery. My later description of Forest Hill applies to its core districts. Among the 
districts and counties of Forest Hill, we find different factor endowments (some are 
closer to the city center than others; some possess more natural resources than others), 
therefore, they display different directions and speeds of state-and-market coevolution.  
 
2. Blessed County, Hubei province (inland) 
 
Hubei province sits squarely in the center of China. Humble County has about 
600,000 residents. Although Humble County is a landlocked county, it has the 
advantage of being located about an hour’s ride from the provincial capital of Wuhan. 
Like Forest Hill, it also enjoys some access to natural resources, primarily wood and 
stone. But Humble is one among over 100 counties in Hubei, largely unheard of outside 
of its province and geographically distant from the coast and other major cities.  
 
3. Upstart County, Jiangxi province (inland) 
 
Jiangxi is nestled between the coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang and the 
central provinces of Hubei and Hunan. In terms of GDP per capita, it is among the 
poorest in the country, ranked 25th out of 31 provinces in 2012. Like Humble County, 
Upstart County is a landlocked locale in a central region and is even more rural than 
Humble County.  
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 What will we find if we take only a snapshot view of the three locations in the 
present period? Table 1 summarizes my observations. As the statistics of Forest Hill City 
are not comparable with the counties, I list the value of fixed asset investment in an 
urban district of Forest Hill (equivalent to a county in size and administrative status), 
Humble County, and Upstart County in 2014 below. In terms of investment value, the 
district in Forest Hill clearly surpasses the other two cases by almost an entire 
magnitude. Looking at the mode of investment promotion today, we find that the district 
in Forest Hill approximates the Weberian-developmental model. In this locale, 
investment promotion is delegated to a team of specialized economic agencies whose 
priority, as one city official described, is to “guide and regulate investments” (B2013-
325). However, turning to the other two inland counties, we find the stark opposite of the 
Weberian model. Investment recruitment is conducted by agencies of all stripes within 
these counties—that is, it is not specialized. Even more anomalously, these agencies are 
deliberately asked not to conduct their duties in an impersonal manner, as Weberian 
norms dictate. A bureaucrat from the Economic and Information Office of Humble 
County described, “One of our common methods of investment recruitment is termed 
‘using kinship and affective ties to recruit investments’ (qinqing zhaoshang), which 
means mobilizing the personal connections of local officials to secure investors” (B2015-
373).   
 
Table 1: Comparing the Present Snapshot in Three Locations 
 Value of fixed asset 
investment in 2014 
Practice of Investment Promotion in 
2014 
Urban District within 
Forest Hill City 
36 Billion Yuan Delegated to specialized economic 
agencies whose focus is on “guiding and 
regulating investments” 
Humble County 19 Billion Yuan All county agencies, regardless of 
nominal functions, are enlisted to 
recruit investors using their personal 
connections 
Upstart County 17 Billion Yuan Similar to Humble County; described as 
en masse, personalized investment 
promotion for short 
 
 
The current practices in the Humble County and Upstart County are clearly in 
violation of Weberian precepts of professional bureaucracies, at least in terms of their 
lack of professionalization (each function is delegated to a specialized office) and 
impartiality (separation of public office from private affairs). Given that both of these 
counties receive much lower investment than the district in Forest Hill, one might thus 
conclude that Weberian norms are positively correlated with economic performance. 
And indeed, if it is possible to collect a large-n dataset that measures the value of 
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investments and codes the practices of investment promotion (note: these are practices, 
not openly stated policies), we will probably find statistical evidence for this cursory 
conclusion. One might further advance a casual argument that it is Weberian traits that 
lead to capitalist markets.  
 But what if instead of taking only a snapshot of the present, we also explore how 
investment promotion practices manifested and evolved at earlier times? This is the 
unique approach I took in my field research. Instead of investigating only present 
outcomes and practices across cases, I looked back in time at all of the cases. Table 2 
summarizes the practices of investment promotion in 2000 and 2014. Surprisingly, 
when we compare two snapshots across the same three locations, we arrive at a different 
picture. It turns out that the district in Forest Hill did not launch market reforms with a 
Weberian bureaucracy—instead, it did 14 years ago what the late-developing inland 
counties are doing today. We also learn that the late-developers tried or at least 
considered adopting en masse, personalized investment recruitment, but the method did 
not work back in 2000. This dormant system was only reactivated recently with some 
success.  
 
Table 2: Comparing Two Snapshots in Three Locations 
 Practice of Investment 
Promotion in 2000 
Practice of Investment 
Promotion in 2014 
Urban District within 
Forest Hill City 
All county agencies, regardless 
of nominal functions, are 
enlisted to recruit investors 
using their personal 
Delegated to specialized 
economic agencies whose 
focus is on “guiding and 
regulating investments” 
Humble County County officials hoped to 
attract investors, but it was “all 
talk and no action;” even when 
leaders tried, they failed to 
produce results. 
All county agencies, regardless 
of nominal functions, are 
enlisted to recruit investors 
using their personal 
connections 
Upstart County Similar to Humble County Similar to Humble County 
 
 
These observations raise questions that we would completely miss had we not 
looked into the past. Why and how did the method of investment promotion in Forest 
Hill evolve from a distinctly non-Weberian mode to its current form? Why did en masse, 
personalized investment promotion not work in the inland counties before but was 
reactivated again today? To answer these questions, we must map change from a 
coevolutionary—rather than linear—perspective. We must also examine connections 






The Coevolutionary Path of Forest Hill City 
 
Since the beginning of market reforms, both the economy and bureaucracy in 
Forest Hill has undergone dramatic transformation. GDP per capita grew about thirty 
times in thirty years. In the 1970s, Forest Hill had a Maoist bureaucracy that was barred 
from contact with the outside world and from engaging in capitalism. Today, its 
bureaucracy actively counsels the city’s champion enterprises to invest overseas and to 
build national brand-names. Over the years, the government of Forest Hill also 
mobilized capital and political support from higher-level governments to construct a 
network of railways that connected the otherwise hill-locked city to other major cities. 
Only thirty years ago, Forest Hill was a backward agrarian society, but today it is 
congested with factories, mega-malls, highways, and heavy traffic. 
How did this great transformation come about? Following the developmental 
state literature, one would expect that the city had resolutely revamped its bureaucracy 
along Weberian precepts. Then, with a professional civil service in place, it introduced 
coherent developmental policies, which then led to rapid economic catch-up. Such a plan 
would have involved many concrete measures. Limited by space, we shall consider two 
basic measures here that were well-documented among the East Asian national 
developmental states (Amsden, 1989; Amsden & Chu, 2003; Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982; 
Wade, 1990). 
1. The city government would have created specialized elite economic agencies, 
equivalent to MITI in Japan and EDB in Singapore.  
2. The city government would have offered market friendly services and incentives 
to attract investments in industries of comparative advantage.8  
With these measures in place, as developmental states like South Korea and Singapore 
appeared to have accomplished intensively, the city should be ready for economic take-
off.  
That, however, was not the story of Forest Hill. Instead, the story unfolds in this 
three-step sequence: Exploit preexisting weak institutions to build markets  emerging 
markets stimulate strong institutions  strong institutions preserve markets. For lack of 
better term, I use “weak” institutions to encompass norms and practices that defy the 
formal, modern, and Weberian (“strong”) institutions found in advanced market 
economies.  
 
Exploit Preexisting Weak Institutions to Build Markets  
For most parts of China, the starting point of attracting external capital and 
investments was 1993. Although “reform and opening” was announced in 1978, the pre-
1993 reforms proceeded with political caution. With the exception of a few special 
economic zones, localities were not allowed to openly embrace foreign investments. 
However, when the central leadership made the decision in 1993 to “build a socialist 
market economy,” that is, to deepen and expand capitalist reforms, locales were finally 
                                                            
8 Strategic efforts by state planners to craft “comparative advantages” (e.g. light manufacturing and 
electronics in Taiwan, heavy industries and ship-building in South Korea) were a key to developmental 
success (Woo-Cumings, 1999, p. 139).  
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given the green light to seek capital and businesses from beyond their city and even 
overseas.  
 How might the decision-makers of Forest Hill City (the leaders and the 
bureaucrats who counsel these leaders) adapt the bureaucracy to capitalize upon new 
economic opportunities? The decision-makers mulled over two options. The first option 
was to specialize. The city already had a preexisting formal bureaucratic apparatus with 
various agencies that were each assigned particular functions (e.g., Investment Bureau, 
Finance Bureau, Education Bureau, Department of Organization). It could charge the 
Investment Bureau with the sole responsibility of courting investors and then staff the 
agency with technocrats. Alternatively, it could mobilize all the agencies to court 
investors using each bureaucrat’s personal connections. To execute this alternative, the 
city leadership could assign investment targets to all the agencies, requiring them to 
attract a stipulated value of investments each year. Attractive bonuses could be offered to 
those who exceed targets. I label this second option en masse, personalized investment 
promotion.  
The en masse, personalized strategy presented drawbacks and even dangers. 
Close personal and kinship ties between investors and patron-bureaucrats would 
obviously breed corruption. From the perspective of local agencies, it would also create a 
conflict of interest between enforcing regulations and attracting investors. In addition, if 
all the agencies performed the same task, the type of investments attracted would likely 
be uncoordinated and low quality.  
Yet in the 1990s, instead of establishing a Weberian investment agency, Forest 
Hill launched what was called “a beehive campaign”—the city enlisted all agencies to 
court investors, assigning them targets and bonuses. And instead of relying on a team of 
professionals, the city leadership urged all the cadres to mobilize their relatives, 
classmates, and friends to invest in Forest Hill. This selection defies the Weberian 
precepts of functional specialization and impersonality. 
Given the obvious advantages of Weberian structures and the obvious problems 
of en masse investment courtship, why did the city select what appears to be an inferior 
option? Stated in evolutionary terms, the success criteria of the players involved shapes 
their selection. At an initial growth stage, the impoverished city was desperate for capital 
and investments of any kind. In the words of a veteran official, “In the past, the goal was 
to push for rapid economic growth, so we welcomed any investor” (B2013-325). 
Selections were also influenced by the constraints and resources at hand. In the 1990s, 
the city could not feasibly secure experts to staff a professional agency (bear in mind that 
this is only a third-tier city, which until today struggles to attract talents). Realistically as 
well, it could not fire anyone from the cadre corps it inherited from the Maoist era.  
Yet although the Forest Hill government was numerously constrained during the 
early 1990s, it possessed certain unique resources. The preexisting Maoist apparatus was 
especially adept at campaign-style policy enforcement, that is, to channel manpower and 
resources toward narrow state-selected goals, paired with aggressive target-setting and 
mass propaganda. This is a mode of policy implementation that Perry (2011) aptly 
describes as “convulsive.” It can be very destructive when put to the wrong ends, as Mao 
did during the terrible famine of the Great Leap Forward. However, in the reform era, it 
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may be reconstituted for the capitalist goal of investment recruitment. Commenting on 
the power of campaigns, one Forest Hill official said, “I feel that our system has a distinct 
advantage: it can get things done quickly and achieve great results” (B2013-323).  
Another advantage unique to a pre-industrialized economy like Forest Hill is the 
affective strength of personal ties. On this point, the observations of Fei Xiaotong, an 
eminent Chinese sociologist, are instructive. As Fei observes, “Modern society is 
composed of strangers” (1992, 42). When strangers relate to one another, they need 
written rules and laws. However, the Chinese society, as Fei underscores, is primarily 
agrarian (according to the National Statistics Bureau, urban population exceeded rural 
dwellers for the first time in Chinese history in 2012). Traditionally, Chinese society is a 
society without strangers—indeed, the term “a society of familiars” (shuren shehui) 
continues to be used in China. Among familiars, trust is strong, perhaps even stronger 
than laws.  
As Fei admonishes, such strong bonds of personal trust among rural people starts 
to erode or become misused when strangers enter the context. He writes, “These 
methods cannot be used with a stranger. China is undergoing a rapid transformation that 
is changing a fundamentally rural society into a modern one. The way of life that has 
been cultivated in rural society is now giving rise to abuses” (1992, 44). This quote 
suggests that we conventionally view personal connections, patronage, and 
patrimonialism negatively not because these features are inherently bad, but because 
they present a poor fit with modern societies peopled with strangers. However, in the 
early 1990s, when Forest Hill had yet to industrialize and urbanize, personal connections 
were a vital resource for growth promotion. By enlisting local cadres to recruit their 
family and friends as investors, bonds of kinship substituted for formal property rights 
protection.  
Paired with en masse bureaucratic participation in courting investors was what I 
call “give-away” policies. Instead of cultivating industries of comparative advantage, city 
officials gave away attractions like cheap land, tax breaks, subsidized electricity, and lax 
regulation indiscriminately to all investors. This prevailed because Forest Hill in the 
1990s was like a start-up company, desperate for any client. Moreover, the idea of 
selective development had not even occurred to the city officials; markets alone were a 
novelty. Taken together, Forest Hill’s development strategies in the 1990s went against 
received wisdom of what governments are supposed to do to promote investments and 
growth.  
When the particular constraints (lack of technocratic staff) and resources 
(campaign-style mobilization and strong personal connections) of the environment in 
Forest Hill in the early 1990s are taken into account, a Weberian model would not 
actually fit best with the situation. When the goal of development was to seek quantity—
rather than quality—growth, en masse investment promotion was actually a more fitting 
choice. Different from other aid-dependent third world nations, local officials in China 
were not told by foreign consultants and aid agencies that they must abide by best 
practices found in the developed world. Instead, they chose to do they thought fitted 
their situations. They probably did not know or care whether their choices defied best 
practices.   
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Emerging Markets Stimulate Strong Institutions 
 Forest Hill’s aggressive investment campaign worked, conditional upon its 
proximity to the coast, with access to investors from Taiwan, and possession of abundant 
natural resources. In 1996, the city’s GDP per capita was over 5,000 Yuan; five years 
later, it jumped to 8,000 Yuan. Although GDP growth was rave news, the city confronted 
a novel contingency: the industrial market was a mess. As all the bureaucrats had 
participated in wooing investors, all sorts of investment arrived, many of which were 
clearly incompatible with one another. One official recalled the situation: “Back then, our 
commercial parks had no plan. A tofu factory set beside another factory making 
fiberboards. How was that going to work?” (B2013-324). During the 1990s, the city had 
several toy factories in operation. However, as these factories lacked auxiliary producers 
(such as makers of plastic parts and packaging), they were unable to sustain production.  
Entering into the 2000s, the city accumulated more industries and a larger tax 
base. At the same time, its pool of natural resources was shrinking; land was becoming 
scarcer; forests were being depleted. The costs of environmental damage built up. 
Further, as the quote above suggests, the city’s officials learned from the failures of 
previously indiscriminate and uncoordinated industrial plans. So now that the city was 
no longer hungry, and hence pickier, concerns of long-term sustainability and 
comparative advantages being to enter the minds of policymakers.  
From 2001-2005, the city underwent a major industrial restructuring effort. The 
city closed small factories in wood and paper production and inefficient small mines. 
State-owned cement factories were merged and restructured, so that they could manage 
larger projects that tapped on economies of scale. Two enterprises, specializing in mining, 
metal refining, and machinery production, emerged triumphant from an earlier period of 
chaotic markets and intensive competition. They would soon become the twin pillars of 
the local economy, around which state planners would select and build the city’s 
comparative advantages. As the economic focus shifted from quantity to quality 
investments, the type of developmental policies turned from give-away to selective. In 
the words of one veteran bureaucrat, “We went through a process from attracting capital 
and investments to selecting capital and investments” (B2013-325). Benefits became 
targeted at investors in priority industries, and low-end polluting enterprises were 
gradually phased out. Meanwhile, a targeted developmental strategy requires 
specialization and coordination on the part of bureaucracy. Thus, as policies evolved 
toward selectivity, the beehive campaign was dismantled and replaced with Weberian 
traits.9  
 
Strong Institutions Preserve Markets 
Today, the agencies of Forest Hill no longer have mandatory investment targets 
or bonuses. Rather, investment work is delegated to a team of specialized economic 
agencies, whose function, as earlier mentioned, is to “guide and regulate investments” 
                                                            
9 Importantly, this does not mean that corruption was eradicated among local governments. Far from that, 
the dominant mode of corruption evolved, becoming more sophisticated and concentrated among the top 
elites, even as the administration progressively Weberianized. This process in China closely parallels the 
evolution of America’s political economy during the Gilded Age (Ang, Forthcoming, Chapter 1 and 5). 
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(B2013-325). By successfully sparking a nascent market, the initial bureaucratic 
strategies of en masse, personalized investment recruitment laid the seeds of its own 
demise.  
This reformed bureaucracy provided a supporting basis for the city’s new 
development priority: to restructure the economy and cultivate targeted industries. By 
2006, GDP per capita had doubled compared to only five years ago. Beyond the overall 
size of the economy, the industrial composition had also changed. The share of GDP 
produced by the city’s four major industries almost doubled within a five-year period 
since 2001. It took twenty years, well into the late 2000s, before Forest Hill showed 
some semblance of the East Asian developmental model, featuring specialized agencies 
and a selective growth strategy of “picking winners” (Evans, 1995). Bureaucratic 
professionalization and selective developmental policies emerged together with—rather 
than preceded and caused—economic growth and restructuring. What first attracted 
capital and built markets was an adapted structure of bureaucracy that defied Weberian 
norms. 
To be clear, the story of Forest Hill’s development is far from over. Officials in 
Forest Hill emphatically agreed that their city had only reached a “launching stage.” 
Although the city has escaped absolute poverty and approximated middle-income status, 
their list of worries about the future ran long: exhaustion of natural resources, severe 
environmental pollution, vulnerability to global economic shocks, low technological 
content of local products, lack of skilled professionals, and so on. The challenges facing 
Forest Hill are broadly symptomatic of the challenge of escaping the “middle-income 
trap,” of which the Chinese leadership is acutely aware (World Bank & State Council, 
2013).  
Figure 2 summarizes and contrasts the conventional linear logic of development 
with my coevolutionary account. The particulars of any coevolutionary narrative will, of 
course, vary across contexts. Readers are advised not to fixate on whether particular 
measures adopted in Forest Hill can be replicated in other countries (even other locales 
in China cannot replicate the same measures at the same time). What is generalizable, 
instead, is the sequence of coevolutionary steps. As Figure 2 illustrates, bureaucracy does 
not come in two dichotomous choices: either Weberian or non-Weberian (or sometimes 
referred to as patrimonial). Rather, between them, there can be many intermediate 
permutations adapted from preexisting socio-political features—improvising such 
institutions is the first step toward building markets. Also, markets are not a binary 
variable: either you have them or you don’t. We should at least draw a basic distinction 
between emerging and mature markets. Emerging markets are fledging, promising, but 
also typically chaotic (think tofu factory beside fiberboard maker). Conventionally good 
institutions like Weberian bureaucracy complement and preserve mature capitalist 
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The Paths of Other Late Local Developers 
 
The experience of Forest Hill is only one among numerous other sub-national 
paths within China. Facing a mixture of growth endowments (located in coastal province 
with abundant natural resources) and constraints (hill-locked), Forest Hill’s 
transformation is less speedy and dramatic than metropolises like Shanghai or cities 
located directly on the coast. What were the paths of locales in the central regions like?  
For decades since market reforms began, Humble County was poor. In self-
deprecating humor, one cadre remarked that the county’s financial situation was worse 
than “eating [rice] budgets,” a term referring to poor counties that exhaust budgets on 
feeding the bureaucracy. He said it was more like “eating [thin gruel] budgets,” meaning 
the county had little to spare even for the most basic needs (B2013-329). Although the 
economy had grown and public finances improved over the past few years, budgets 
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remained tight in Humble County. Many agencies still lacked adequate funding and 
salaries. 
What did the trajectory in Humble County look like in the 1990s through the 
2000s? Did it not try the adaptive strategies used in Forest Hill City during its early 
growth stage? Actually, some officials of Humble County did try (or at least considered 
trying). But stuck inland, their attempts did not produce a miracle. During the 1980s, 
like other localities throughout the country, Humble County had set up township and 
village enterprises (TVEs). But with limited access to networks, investors, and clients, 
the TVEs performed poorly, and many ended deep in debt. Then, in the 1990s and early 
2000s, the county heeded the call of central initiatives to restructure state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and court investments. But the efforts in Humble were largely 
superficial.  Restructured SOEs and TVEs did not turn into vibrant private enterprises, 
as did places like Zhejiang province. In addition, efforts to court investors at that time 
were futile, “more talk than action” (B2013-329), because “people didn’t even know 
about this place” (B2013-331). Compared to Forest Hill, not much changed in Humble 
County during the decade after 1993. Bureaucracies and markets did not co-evolve with 
transformative results.  
The big break for Humble County and also for Upstart County, both inland 
locales in central China, arrived around 2005. The important question is: What was the 
source of this big break? Why was it not available earlier? This new lease of economic life 
for the central regions came from the coast, from cities like Forest Hill. Once coastal 
locales reach middle-income status, they were pressured by rising factor costs at home to 
replace lower-end manufacturing with higher-end activities. Factories on the coast went 
spontaneously in search of investment locations in China’s own neglected backyard. This 
phenomenon is termed “industrial relocation.” One might also think of it as a domestic 
version of the flying geese theory; coastal regions led the process of economic and 
institutional coevolution and then later on brought opportunities to the inland laggards.  
When new opportunities arrived from the coast in the mid-2000s, a dormant 
engine roared into action. And what type of bureaucracy and policy did Humble and 
Upstart adopt? Almost the same ones as Forest Hill did over a decade ago, a mixture of 
en masse investment promotion with give-away developmental policies. Uncannily, the 
prevailing practices in Humble County shadowed practices that had recently been 
phased out in Forest Hill. One official from Humble County described: “Assigning 
investment tasks to all the departments can incentivize everyone to act together, fully 
utilizing everyone’s networks and resources. We are now in the midst of an all-county 
campaign to promote investment. Our county is a small place, with no particular 
advantages in location or transportation. How are we going to develop economically if we 
don’t pursue investments in en masse? Anyway, the whole country is doing this” (B2013-
318). 
Yet even though we observe some striking similarities between the current 
adaptive strategies of less-endowed regions and the past strategies of more-endowed 
ones, the future path that will unravel in Humble County is unlikely to be a mere 
replication of their richer and more developmental cousins. That is because, as a sub-
national late developer, Humble County presently operates in a macro environment that 
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is different from the one that coastal cities like Forest Hill encountered in the 1990s and 
2000s. In recent years, the central government has articulated a different developmental 
role for local states, emphasizing social services provision and environmental protection 
over brute capital accumulation, in close approximation of what Evans calls the “twenty-
first century developmental state” (Evans, 2011; Evans & Heller, 2013). Even at its 
current early growth stage, the officials of Humble County clearly expressed more 
concern about the environment costs of rapid industrialization than their peers in Forest 
Hill had. 
Comparing the coevolutionary trajectories of the three locations, we learn that 
the economic effects of any strategy of institutional adaptation (such as the beehive 
campaign) are conditional upon basic endowments like location. This axiom applies to 
standard good institutions (such as the protection of private property rights) as well. 
Collier is worth quoting at length on this point: “Good governance and policy help a 
country to realize its opportunities but they cannot generate opportunities where none 
exist and they cannot defy gravity. Even the best governance and policies are not going to 
turn Malawi into a rich country—it just does not have the opportunities” (2007, 64). 
However, I differ from Collier in one critical respect, that is, while growth 
opportunities may be heavily influenced by geography, entrepreneurial histories, and 
natural resources, they are not static. As surrounding economies change, so too do the 
opportunities for nations and locales. Humble County and Upstart County used to be 
stuck; no matter how hard they tried, they could not attract investments as their coastal 
peers did in the 1990s. Yet unexpectedly, their opportunities emerged another decade 
later, after the economies of the first-movers had taken off. This suggests that while the 
economic effects of factor endowments cannot be ignored, their effects are not fixed or 
deterministic.  
My approach of comparing local trajectories also suggests that we cannot study 
sub-national units (and indeed countries as well) as if they are independent units of 
observation—because clearly they are interdependent (on world politics, see also 
Katzenstein, 1975). The point of comparing sub-national units is not to generate more 
units of observation for testing or to pit them side-by-side as static regional models. 
What is of interest in sub-national comparison is not just “variation in economic 
outcomes” and how “local-level variables determine different local economic realities 
(Rithmire, 2014, 167), but also connections across regions and how each locale’s path 





Do Weberian bureaucracies lead to markets or vice versa? My answer is that it 
depends on the stage of development, within countries and even within locales of a single 
country. We must qualify both the functions and forms of bureaucracies at market-
building and market-preserving phases of development. We must also distinguish 
between the pressures exerted on institutional change by emerging markets versus by 
mature markets. The type of bureaucracy and method of investment recruitment varies 
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for low-income compared to middle-income economies. Why? Because development 
priorities evolve as a society transitions from absolute poverty to moderate income. And 
because the constraints and resources of poor, rural, and communist settings are 
drastically different from those of moderately wealthy, urban, and capitalist systems. 
Particular organizational forms, rules, and policies work only when they fit the goals, 
constraints, and resources of particular environments. Even a Weberian bureaucratic 
structure—as universally desirable as it may initially seem—is not actually universally 
best.  
To suggest that early development requires institutions different from those of 
late development is not new. In an incisive historical study, Chang (2002) argues that 
contrary to the norms of limited government that are commonly prescribed to 
developing countries today, wealthy Western nations had actually deployed 
interventionist policies to kick-start their domestic industries when they themselves were 
developing. Likewise, Rodrik asserts that “igniting economic growth and sustaining it are 
somewhat different enterprises” (2007, 16). Doner’s (2009) study also demonstrates that 
while Thailand had developed the right state capabilities to support early 
industrialization, it failed to continue evolving its political institutions for technological 
upgrading.   
My chapter clearly extends on these themes, but I seek to go beyond them in one 
key respect. I emphasize that the first step of development entails “exploiting preexisting 
weak institutions to build markets.” Poor societies almost always begin with an 
abundance of weak institutions, such as informal and personal connections, communal 
and tribal affiliations, patrimonialism, weak enforcement of formal rules, and so on. 
Normally, such features are viewed as impediments to economic development that need 
to be removed before markets can grow. I argue the opposite: what we normally perceive 
as weak institutions are actually the raw material that we have to improvise upon in 
order to spark emerging markets. But unless we drop our perceptions that only certain 
particular organizational forms are good and others are inferior, we cannot imagine and 
register, much less harness, the developmental potential of apparently weak institutions.  
 The recognition that state capacity varies at different stages of development—that 
is, at different levels of income, industrialization, and modernization—is especially 
significant for developing countries. As the editors underscore in the Introduction, “Most 
developing countries are struggling to move beyond the dichotomous choice posed by 
‘Washington Consensus’ versus ‘developmental states” (footnote 11, 20). The 
Washington Consensus is a theory for advanced capitalist economies in the West. The 
developmental state model is a theory for a select group of countries in Asia endowed 
with unique historical conditions and exceptionally strong bureaucracies. Neither set of 
conditions applies to much of the developing world, which is poor and yet modernized. 
For these societies, we need to explore how development may occur not because of 
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